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INTRODUCTION
On September 17, 2011, protestors descended upon New York
City’s Financial District, announcing that they were occupying Wall
Street to call attention to the country’s growing income disparities
and other injustices.1 The first three reported arrests were of
protestors who were accused of wearing masks in public.2 Another
woman was arrested on graffiti charges after drawing on the sidewalk
with chalk.3 As participants marched north toward Union Square one
week after the Occupy Wall Street (“Occupy”) protests began,
tension between police and protestors escalated with approximately
* Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I am
thankful to the Fordham Urban Law Journal for the opportunity to participate in the
Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, to Lenese Herbert, Bennett Capers, and other
colloquium participants for their helpful comments, and to W. Thomas Hughes for
his invaluable research assistance.
1. Colin Moynihan, Protesters Find Wall Street Off Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2011, at A22.
2. Colin Moynihan, Wall Street Protests Continue, With at Least 6 Arrested,
N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (Sept. 19, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/09/19/wall-street-protests-continue-with-at-least-5-arrested/.
3. Id.
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eighty arrests and the use of pepper spray by police officers.4
Protestors posted video footage of the arrests on Facebook, Twitter,
and other social networking sites, calling attention to a growing
movement.5 By winter of 2012, Occupy had spread to more than one
hundred cities across the country, and clashes between protestors and
police clad in riot gear became familiar.6
At a party the following spring, a friend of mine who is a New York
Police Department (NYPD) detective told me that the media were
speculating that the NYPD had acted unlawfully by checking whether
participants in the Occupy Wall Street movement were subject to any
outstanding arrest warrants. Because I teach Criminal Procedure, I
immediately thought through the Fourth Amendment analysis.
Neither inquiring about a person’s identity nor checking a database
for warrants is itself a restraint on liberty or invasion of privacy, and
therefore such investigations need not be justified.7 Even if the
warrant check occurred after a seizure, the seizure would be lawful as
long as an objective justification existed; an individual officer’s
subjective desire to use the seizure as a pretext to determine the
person’s identity and the presence of any outstanding warrants would
not affect the lawfulness of the seizure.8 However, I then considered
the question through the lens of the First Amendment and Equal
Protection. Critics, I explained, would argue that a check for
warrants, if based solely on a person’s participation in a protest,
discriminates on the basis of the exercise of a fundamental right.9

4. Colin Moynihan, 80 Arrested as Financial District Protest Moves North, N.Y.
TIMES CITY ROOM (Sept. 24, 2011, 8:31 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/09/24/80-arrested-as-financial-district-protest-moves-north/.
5. Jillian Dunham, Protests Stir Up Voices on the Web, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM
(Sept. 30, 2011, 10:35 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/protestsstir-up-voices-on-the-web/.
6. According to Occupy Wall Street supporters, in the year following the
movement’s formation with the first New York City protest, police made 7,623
arrests in 120 different cities. See OCCUPYARRESTS.COM, http://occupyarrests.
moonfruit.com/ (last updated May 13, 2013) (tallying a running total of the number of
arrests made in the United States since September 17, 2011).
7. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). See
generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that police activity
constitutes a search only if it implicates reasonable expectations of privacy).
8. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816–19 (1996).
9. Alisa Chang, Using NYPD Warrant Squads to Monitor Protesters May
Violate Constitution: Experts, WNYC NEWS (May 4, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/
articles/wnyc-news/2012/may/04/using-police-warrant-squads-monitor-occupy-wallstreet-protestors-may-be-unconstitutional-legal-experts-say/
(“Executing
old
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I might have forgotten about the brief conversation with my friend
if I hadn’t watched three days earlier as uniformed officers descended
upon my neighborhood in anticipation of an Occupy march to Union
Square Park. Marked patrol vehicles lined both sides of Fourteenth
Street. Officers stood side to side, legs spread in a triangle stance.
From their body language, I gathered that they were showing their
power, preparing for confrontation, although no protest crowds had
yet arrived. I assumed at the time that if I construed the image in that
light, protestors would as well.
That protest, which Occupy
supporters later called the “May Day Siege by NYPD,”10 ended with
the arrests of at least thirty demonstrators and “occasionally bloody
clashes” between police and protestors.11
On further reflection, I realized that I had missed an opportunity to
answer my detective-friend’s question with another question: Why?
Even if the law permits warrant checks, why use an Occupy protest as
an opportunity for mass warrant checks any more than the NYPD
would take the same action at an afternoon street fair or outdoor
concert?
Fast forward two months. I was in Portland, Oregon, where I used
to be a prosecutor. As I drove past City Hall, I noticed what
appeared to be an extensive makeshift campsite outside. But in
addition to the sleeping bags and blankets, I saw handmade signs.
When I saw some of my local friends later in the week, I asked them
about the scene. Their frustration was clear. The protest of the city’s
anti-camping laws had been going on for more than a month, but the
police so far had been leaving the protestors alone, even though at
least some of the protestors’ activities were in violation of the law.12
It was time to start making arrests, my friends suggested.13 I

warrants—no matter how minor—is legal. But legal experts say the tactic becomes
illegal if it is done solely to investigate political activity.”).
10. See OCCUPYARRESTS.COM, http://occupyarrests.moonfruit.com (last updated
May 13, 2013) (arrest data for May 1, 2012).
11. Andy Newman & Colin Moynihan, At May Day Demonstrations, Traffic
Jams and Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at A20. Supporters of OWS claim that
the protest resulted in 97 arrests. OCCUPYARRESTS.COM, http://occupyarrests.
moonfruit.com/ (last updated May 13, 2013) (arrest data for May 1, 2012).
12. See Chase G. Hall, Portland Hunger Striker, Supporters Camp Outside City
Hall, OREGONLIVE.COM (July 3, 2012, 7:31 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/
portland/index.ssf/2012/07/protesters_camped_in_front_of.html.
13. Others have suggested that cities have not been sufficiently aggressive in
enforcement against protestors. See Chip Johnson, Oakland Blames Police, Not
Occupy Mobs, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 2012, at C1.
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remembered my conversation with the NYPD detective. I thought
about all those officers lining the street outside my apartment. I
remembered hearing neighborhood residents wonder aloud why
police didn’t just leave the protestors alone.
This Essay explores the policing of protestors, but it does so in a
very limited way. It does not attempt to explore the many disturbing
claims that have arisen from the Occupy movement about the legality
of individual police responses. Rather, it looks solely to the issue of
police discretion in enforcing criminal law against protestors,
assuming that criminal law has been violated14 and that a police
response would be lawful, both substantively and procedurally.
Specifically, the Essay looks beyond formal law to the literatures on
procedural fairness and community policing to discern neutral
principles to govern the exercise of police discretion in this context.
Part I of the Essay provides an overview of the role that discretion
plays in the policing of protests, presenting the potential for both
overenforcement and underenforcement of criminal law. Part II
looks to the principles of community policing and procedural justice
to guide the exercise of police discretion. In Part III, an application
of those general principles to the policing of protestors exposes
tensions that exist between community policing and procedural
justice philosophies, but also indicates the importance of ex ante,
transparent, and neutral decision making by law enforcement.
I. DISCRETION IN ENFORCEMENT
Policing the conduct of contemporary social movements raises
several issues of formal law. Protestors and their supporters argue
that police have used excessive force in attempting to restrain and
arrest protestors,15 that police have fabricated the facts used to justify
14. To be clear, “the Occupy Wall Street movement expressly embraces
nonviolence (and for the most part has been nonviolent).” Bernard E. Harcourt, The
Politics of Incivility, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 345, 356 (2012).
15. A report from the Protest and Assembly Rights Project alleges a broad
pattern of aggressive policing against the Occupy movement. SARAH KNUCKEY ET
AL., THE GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC & THE WALTER LEITNER INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS
CLINIC, SUPPRESSING PROTEST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. RESPONSE
OCCUPY WALL STREET (2012), available at http://chrgj.org/wpTO
content/uploads/2012/10/suppressingprotest.pdf (alleging a pattern of aggressive
policing against the Occupy movement). Multiple lawsuits have been filed alleging
excessive force against protestors by the New York Police Department. See Margaret
Hartmann, NYPD’s Occupy Pepper Spraying Sparks More Lawsuits, Calls for Police
Oversight, N.Y. MAG. (July 31, 2012), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/
2012/07/nypds-occupy-pepper-spraying-sparks-new-lawsuit.html.
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police responses,16 that law enforcement has resorted to intrusive and
unlawful domestic surveillance in monitoring the activities of
protestors,17 and that laws restricting the use of public spaces violate
the First Amendment.18 But even assuming that police conduct is
supported by formal law, questions of police discretion remain.
When should police enforce criminal law against protestors, and when
should they opt for non-enforcement? And, if police are going to
intervene, how aggressive should their actions be? Should they warn
the protestors? Issue a citation? Arrest?
Policing of protestors can raise problems of both over- and underenforcement. Traditionally, criminal justice scholars have focused on
the problem of overenforcement of criminal law, arguing that
overenforcement
unleashes
undeserved
punishment,
disproportionately targets minority groups, and reduces individual
incentives to comply with criminal law.19 Applied in the protest
context, concerns about overenforcement could include concerns
about over-criminalization of conduct perceived to be harmless or
minor,20 such as public camping or wearing masks in public.21
16. In New York, for example, protestors who were charged with disorderly
conduct claimed that police intentionally led protestors onto an area of the Brooklyn
Bridge where pedestrians were not permitted. See Andrew Keshner, ‘Public’ Tweets
Are Subject to D.A.’s Subpoena, Judge Says, N.Y. L.J. (July 3, 2012),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202561602402.
Prosecutors subpoenaed protestors’ Twitter posts to demonstrate that protestors
knew the area was off-limits. Ross Buettner, A Brooklyn Protester Pleads Guilty
After His Twitter Posts Sink His Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A31.
17. See KNUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15 (alleging surveillance by the NYPD);
Linda Lye, Spying on Occupy?, ACLU N. CAL. (July 17, 2012),
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/freedom_of_press_and_speech/spying_on_occupy.shtm
l (alleging surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
18. See generally Sarah Kunstler, The Right to Occupy—Occupy Wall Street and
the First Amendment, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 989 (2012) (arguing that sleeping and
camping outdoors constitutes speech that should be protected); Udi Ofer, Occupy the
Parks: Restoring the Right to Overnight Protest in Public Parks, 39 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1155 (2012).
19. See generally David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999); Tracy
Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271 (1998); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization:
The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal
Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1005 (2001); William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006).
20. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
710 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505 (2001) (arguing that broad codes overcriminalize behavior and expand
law enforcement power).
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Overenforcement can also raise separate concerns about selective
enforcement,22 if protestors believe that the law is being enforced
against them disproportionately because of their involvement in a
protest movement.23 And it can raise concerns about the degree of
law enforcement’s response, such as complaints that police used
excessive force or resorted to custodial arrests when lesser
interventions would have sufficed.24
More recently, scholars have called attention to the potential
harms of underenforcement of criminal law.25 The failure of police to
enforce criminal law can embolden criminals, undermine public
safety, and deteriorate expectations about law enforcement’s
willingness to protect members of society equally. Complaints about
underenforcement in the protest context could come from
neighborhood residents and other private citizens who believe that
the protests infringe on their property rights.26 Neighborhood

21. One much-discussed arrest in New York was of a 56-year-old woman who was
knitting in a folding chair, because chairs in the park were prohibited. Colin
Moynihan, At Least 4 Arrested at Zuccotti Park After Occupy March, N.Y. TIMES
CITY ROOM (July 12, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/07/12/at-least-3-arrested-at-zuccotti-park-after-occupy-march.
22. See Roberts, supra note 19, at 1007–09.
23. See Gina Barton, March to Protest Death in Police Custody Ends in 4 Arrests,
MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. SENTINEL ONLINE, Nov. 12, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/
news/milwaukee/march-to-protest-death-in-police-custody-ends-in-four-arrestsc87k34k-179026431.html (quoting protestors who claimed that police arrested them
as punishment for having participated in an Occupy protest); Barry Grey, Occupy
Protests Targeted by FBI Counterterror Units, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Dec.
27, 2012), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/12/27/poli-d27.html (alleging that
municipal police and the FBI are engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine the
Occupy Protests).
24. KNUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15; Hartmann, supra note 15.
25. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998); Dan
M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1153 (1998); Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct
“Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 617, 627–28 (2006);
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1721 (2006)
(delineating when underenforcement of criminal law is normatively troublesome);
Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996)
(identifying “anomalous zones” in which “certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as
embodying policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended”); William J.
Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (1998).
26. In New York City, for example, the initial site of Occupy’s activities was
Zuccotti Park, a privately owned but publicly accessible park in lower Manhattan.
See Janos D. Marton, Representing an Idea: How Occupy Wall Street’s Attorneys
Overcame the Challenges of Representing Non-Hierarchical Movements, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107, 1140 (2012).
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residents might also complain that the disorder resulting from public
camping and other minor offenses contributes to a deterioration of
the neighborhood and could contribute to a general sense of
lawlessness.27 Underenforcement of criminal law against protestors
can also lead to concerns about equity if police appear to be
tolerating conduct from one group of individuals that it would not
tolerate from others.28
II. LOOKING BEYOND FORMAL LAW: PROCESS AND COMMUNITY
Formal law does little to prevent either overenforcement or
underenforcement. The law gives police broad discretion to act in the
face of unlawful conduct. Temporary restrictions on liberty are
permitted as long as reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is
present.29 A custodial arrest is permissible as long as probable cause
exists to believe the arrestee has committed a crime,30 no matter how
minor the offense.31 An officer who is justified in stopping or
arresting an individual may also use reasonable force to effectuate the
seizure,32 and courts are generally deferential to officers in
determining whether the level of force used was reasonable.33
Formal law is even more deferential to police discretion when they
choose not to enforce the law.34 Absent discriminatory motivations

27. James Wilson and George Kelling’s influential “broken windows” theory
posits that low-level disorder contributes to more serious crime if left uncorrected.
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29–38.
28. See Lenese C. Herbert, O.P.P.: How “Occupy’s” Race-Based Privilege May
Improve Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence for All, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 727, 731–
35 (2012) (noting that Occupy protestors are primarily white and appear to expect
better treatment from police than minority communities have experienced).
29. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
30. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415 (1976).
31. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008) (holding that a custodial
arrest for a misdemeanor was valid even when the state legislature had designated
the crime a non-arrestable crime); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 320–
21 (2001) (holding that a custodial arrest for a seatbelt offense was lawful, even
though the maximum penalty was a fine, because the offense was designated a crime
by the legislature).
32. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98–99 (2005); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989) (noting that “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat
thereof to effect it”).
33. E.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–86 (2007).
34. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1492 (1989) (noting that because the Constitution does not obligate the
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against a protected class, police have unfettered discretion not to
arrest a person, despite the strength of the evidence, just as
prosecutors can choose to decline charging.35 As Alexandra Natapoff
has observed, “Jurisprudentially speaking, underenforcement is a
non-issue.”36 Principles of both procedural justice and community
policing demonstrate, however, that the desirability of police conduct
generally, and exercises of discretion in particular, should not be
determined solely through a jurisprudential lens.
A. Procedural Justice
Although an exhaustive discussion of the lessons of procedural
justice would go beyond the scope of this Essay, the truncated version
of the central thesis of procedural justice is this: When people
perceive a decision-making process to be fair, they are more likely to
accept the outcome of that process, even if the decision itself is
adverse.37 Thanks to the influential work of social psychologist Tom
Tyler and other scholars, we know that public perceptions about
fairness are derived from four distinguishable factors. First, people
are more likely to be satisfied with a process when they have been
given an opportunity to participate by expressing their side of the
story.38 Second, perceptions of fairness are higher when people
perceive the decision maker to be neutral.39 Third, people are more
satisfied when authority figures are perceived as having acted out of a

government to enforce the law, “random underenforcement is not constitutionally
objectionable”).
35. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
36. Natapoff, supra note 25, at 1756.
37. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003); Tom Tyler, Peter Degoey & Heather Smith,

Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures Matters: A Test of the
Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model, 70 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 913 (1996); see also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 196 (2002)
(“[P]eople’s main consideration when evaluating the police and the courts is the
treatment that they feel people receive from those authorities.”). See generally JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 14 (1971).
38. Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS 84 (2004); Tom R.
Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for
Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 355, 379–80 (2003).
39. Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy:
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 253, 255 (2004).
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sense of care and benevolence for them.40 Fourth, people care about
how they are treated. When authorities treat them politely and with
dignity and respect, they are more likely to perceive the process as
fair.41
Procedural justice research has important implications for policing.
Psychological research demonstrates that perceptions about the
fairness of law enforcement’s conduct drive the public’s acceptance of
law enforcement’s legitimacy, separate from the lawfulness of police
action. For example, in a recent study, Tracy Meares, Tom Tyler, and
Jacob Gardener measured the relationship between people’s
assessment of police conduct and both the legality of the officer’s
conduct and the perception of the officer’s procedural fairness.42
They did this by showing subjects videos in which police were
depicted as wielding some level of authority, ranging from verbal
commands to the use of force, over a stopped person.43 Prior to
watching a video, subjects were told whether there was a lawful basis
for the police conduct.44 After watching the video, subjects were
asked to evaluate the police along the various dimensions of
procedural fairness.45 Subjects were then asked to rate their desire to
punish the officers.46 This design permitted the researchers to divide
the resulting data (how much to punish) into four groups of police
encounters: 1) lawful encounter with high procedural justice; 2) lawful
encounter with low procedural justice; 3) unlawful encounter with
high procedural justice; and 4) unlawful encounter with high
procedural justice.47
Meares et al. found that the lawfulness of the police conduct had
only a small, if any, effect on subjects’ desire to punish the officers.48
For example, among groups who perceived there to be a high level of
40. Id.
41. Id.; Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 38, at 380; see also Michael M. O’Hear,
Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 420–24 (2008)
(summarizing procedural justice theory).
42. Tracey L. Meares et al., The Two Different Worlds We Live In: Lawfulness
and Perceived Police Misconduct (Yale Law Sch., Public Working Paper No. 255,
2012).
43. Id. app. B at 2.
44. Id. at 16. For example, some were told that police stopped a suspect for
driving “erratically,” while others were told that the stopped person was driving
lawfully. Id.
45. Id. app. B at 2–3.
46. Id. app. B at 3.
47. Id. at 17.
48. Id. at 18 fig.2.
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procedural justice, subjects who witnessed an unlawful encounter
reported, on average, a desire to punish of 1.39,49 while subjects who
witnessed a lawful encounter reported a desire to punish of 1.36.50
When procedural justice was low, subjects who witnessed an unlawful
encounter reported a desire to punish of 2.25, compared to 2.10 for
subjects who witnessed a lawful encounter.51 Those same data tell a
different story about the effect of procedural justice. Subjects who
perceived high procedural justice had low inclinations to punish
(either 1.36 for lawful encounters or 1.39 for unlawful), while subjects
who perceived low procedural justice were much more desirous of
punishment (2.10 for lawful encounters, 2.25 for unlawful).52
Perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy affect not only public
sentiment toward authority, but also actual conduct.
By
demonstrating that people are more likely to comply with rules when
they are viewed as legitimate,53 the procedural justice literature adds
an important dimension to the usual deterrence-based crime-control
model of punishment.54 While traditional deterrence theory posits
that people comply with the law to avoid sanction, social scientists
have found a direct relationship between compliance with the law and
perceptions about the legitimacy of the authority underlying the law.55
People are also more likely to cooperate with law enforcement when
they perceive law enforcement’s authority to be legitimate.56 Not
surprisingly, perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy can be
driven by individual experiences:
49. Id. Subjects were asked to number the intensity of their desire to punish, on a
scale from 1 to 5, with higher numbers indicating a greater desire to punish. Id. at 18
n.56.
50. Id. at 18 fig.2.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
54. See Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer
to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 984–85 (2000)
(“Research findings demonstrate that both specific decisions and more general laws
and public policies are difficult to enforce using threats of punishment.”).
55. Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV.
391, 400 (2000) (summarizing research); Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a

Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of
Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 707, 716–17 (2000).
56. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 267
(2008) (“Cooperation increases not only when the public views the police as effective
. . . but also when citizens see the police as legitimate authorities who are entitled to
be obeyed.”).
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Personal experience does have political impact. The judgments of
adults about their obligation to follow legal authorities respond to
their experiences with particular police officers and judges. Because
experience influences legitimacy, legal authorities cannot take
citizens’ allegiance for granted. It can be eroded by unsatisfactory
experiences with police officers or judges. And legitimacy will be
eroded if the legal system consistently fails to meet citizens’
standards. On the other hand, the existing reserve of legitimacy can
be increased over time by positive personal experiences with police
officers and judges.57

The procedural justice literature teaches us, then, to look beyond
the lawfulness of police conduct to other normative factors. Law
enforcement’s willingness to listen, neutrality, respect, and caring
affect perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy, which in turn
affect compliance with substantive criminal law and cooperation with
police. Accordingly, procedural justice factors should help shape law
enforcement’s exercise of discretion.
B.

Community Policing

Another model of policing that offers lessons for the exercise of
police discretion comes from the community justice movement.
Although the term “community policing” can be elusive, it is perhaps
best understood in contrast to the rapid-response model of policing
that was dominant through most of the twentieth century. In rapidresponse policing, law enforcement reacts to crimes as they occur.58
Its goal is to identify a suspect, gather sufficient evidence to arrest
and charge the suspect, and then to prosecute and punish the offender
for the offenses charged.59 In this form of law enforcement, each
actor serves a limited purpose. Police become involved only after a
crime has occurred, prosecutors step in once evidence has been
gathered against a suspect, and citizens are relevant only to the extent
they serve as suspects, complainants, witnesses, or jurors.60 When law
enforcement takes action—a stop, an arrest, the filing of criminal
charges—the rapid-response model looks to formal law to determine
57. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 53, at 106.
58. Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions
of Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 286–87 (2012).
59. Id. at 287.
60. Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 992 (2003); Anthony C.
Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 339
(2002).
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the lawfulness of governmental conduct.61 When a shortage of
resources forces law enforcement to opt for underenforcement or
non-enforcement, the rapid-response model looks to the criminal
code for guidance, prioritizing serious offenses over petty ones.62
The community justice movement, in contrast, calls for greater
involvement of and cooperation with communities at every stage of
the justice system.63 A model of community cooperation can affect
exercises of discretion in multiple ways that contrast with rapidresponse policing. First, in community policing, law enforcement
must look to community members not merely as complainants and
witnesses, but as “stakeholders” who not only help police identify
community concerns, but also help develop and even implement
responsive strategies.64
Community policing also affects law enforcement’s discretion in
prioritizing resources. In identifying the most important community
concerns, participating stakeholders will look more to their everyday,
real-world problems rather than to the ranking of criminal offenses as
defined by the formal criminal code. Accordingly, in community
policing, police often exercise their discretion by addressing low-level
crimes that might not warrant attention in comparison to more
serious crimes, but which the community views as detrimental to their

61. Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 415–16
(2000) (noting that police are limited by statute and exceeding that statute is
“generally a violation of local and federal law”).
62. Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 288; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION & DEF. FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b)(ii)–(iii) (1993) (listing “the extent of the
harm caused by the offense” and “the disproportion of the authorized punishment in
relation to the particular offense or the offender” among factors relevant to the
decision to prosecute).
63. See Heymann, supra note 61, at 420 (2000); Debra Livingston, Police

Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the
New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 575 (1997); Tracey L. Meares, Praying for
Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1600 (2002).
64. Of the jargon that emerges from community justice programs, one of the most
frequent terms is “stakeholder.” See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 457, 502 (2000) (discussing the role of “stakeholders” in shaping norms under
new policing approaches); Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution:
A Restorative Justice Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 720 (2000) (noting the importance of “stakeholder”
agreement in restorative justice programs); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy
and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 410 (2000) (noting that participation of
community “stakeholders” legitimizes government action).
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quality of life.65 The enforcement of desirable social norms, rather
than the criminal code itself, is often the focus of community policing.
For example, while formal law prohibits the enactment of vague
criminal prohibitions, scholars who support community policing have
advocated for giving law enforcement discretion to enforce
community norms that are often ambiguous.66 Similarly, in the name
of community, cities have enacted or increased the enforcement of
substantive criminal laws that are focused more on social compliance
than traditional criminal punishment, such as prohibitions against
public camping,67 panhandling,68 and loitering.69
Moreover, because police look to affected stakeholders in
identifying, prioritizing, and responding to community problems,
community policing tends to be extremely localized.70
One
neighborhood’s biggest problem could be a red-light district with a
proliferation of sex shops and visible prostitution activities. In
another neighborhood, domination of public spaces by gang members
or drug dealers could be the driving concern. To residents and
business owners in another district, graffiti and loud skateboarding
could be of paramount importance.
65. Eric W. Nicastro, Confronting the Neighbors: Community Impact Panels in
the Realm of Restorative Justice and Punishment Theory, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 261, 261 (2003). Advocates of devoting resources to minor, quality of life
offenses often invoke the broken windows theory in support. See Kelling & Wilson,
supra note 27.
66. For more thorough discussions of the role of enforcement of social norms in
community policing efforts, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367–77 (1997); Livingston, supra note 63, at 578–84;
Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 377 (2001);
Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to
Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L.
REV. 1253, 1256–58 (2000).
67. See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302–06 (9th Cir. 1996);
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1562–84 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
68. See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 701–06 (2d Cir. 1993) (striking
down an ordinance prohibiting loitering for the purpose of panhandling); Helen
Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the
Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 896 n.5 (1991) (summarizing laws regulating
panhandling).
69. See Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About
Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 143; Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and
Race, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 129 (2000) (arguing that gang influence on
“community mores” undermines the inner cities’ chances for revitalization).
70. Archon Fung, Beyond and Below the New Urbanism: Citizen Participation
and Responsive Spatial Reconstruction, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 615, 629 (2001);
Heymann, supra note 61, at 421 (“[P]olice are accountable to neighborhoods as well
as to cities . . . .”).
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Finally, community policing affects police discretion in devising
responsive strategies to community crime concerns. Rapid-response
policing treats arrest, prosecution, and punishment as paramount
objectives, necessary to achieve incapacitation and deterrence.71
Perhaps because it often prioritizes low-level quality of life offenses
rather than serious crimes with immediate, identifiable harms,
community policing treats arrest, prosecution, and punishment as a
means to the end of improving community satisfaction.72
If
enforcement of criminal law against individual offenders on a reactive
basis is necessary to solving community concerns, it can be part of
community policing.
However, community policing tends to
emphasize long-term, proactive crime-prevention strategies over
short term, reactive ones.73
III. DISCRETION, POLICE, AND PROTESTERS
A superficial comparison of community policing and procedural
justice might suggest that the two theories would carry similar
implications for the exercise of police discretion. Both procedural
justice and community policing theories look beyond formal law to
other normative values, and both look specifically to the voices of
citizens who are affected by police decision making to effectuate
these values. Community policing does so by emphasizing police
cooperation with the public and the prioritization of long-term
problem solving over criminal punishment for its own sake.
Procedural justice does so by encouraging police to give suspects a
voice and by treating them without bias, with respect and dignity, and
with a sense of caring and benevolence. Although the two theories
have different emphases, they both tend broadly to evoke images of a
more democratic, transparent, and accountable form of policing. But
a deeper attempt to apply these shared principles in the context of
policing protestors reveals potential tensions between the two
policing theories.

71. See Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 287, 291.
72. This model of “problem solving” policing is often attributed to Herman
Goldstein. See generally HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING
(1990); Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25
CRIME & DELINQ. 236 (1979).
73. Heymann, supra note 61, at 420 (“[O]ur policing strategies in the last decade
have turned heavily towards prevention of crimes . . . rather than individual events.”).
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A. Rules of Engagement: Communication and Transparency
Both procedural justice and community policing principles suggest
that guidelines for police discretion in the protest context should be
both ex ante and transparent. Ad hoc decisions by individual officers,
especially in the chaotic environment of mass protest activity, will
inevitably lead to variations in treatment, which undermine the
perception of neutrality.74 Moreover, by its very definition, ad hoc
discretion also undermines community policing’s goal of preventing
problems before they occur through ex ante problem solving rather
than reacting to them.75 Instead, police should adopt guidelines about
what type of conduct will trigger what level of police response, and
should make these guidelines available to protestors and the public.
Moreover, police should develop these guidelines not unilaterally,
but in cooperation with the affected community.
Permitting
community input to shape the rules of engagement advances both
community policing’s emphasis on public participation and
procedural justice’s emphasis on giving voice to those affected by
police decision making.76 There is, however, a potential difference
between procedural justice and community policing principles on the
question of which constituencies’ opinions are relevant.
In community policing, police are encouraged to partner with
“stakeholders,” a population that can include neighborhood
residents, local businesses, schools, healthcare and social service
agencies—“practically everyone,” as one scholar noted.77 The limited
research seeking to describe the constituencies involved in
74. In other contexts, the contributory role of broad police discretion to unequal
treatment is well explored. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56
(1999) (striking down a city ordinance aimed at gang-affiliated loitering in part
because it was too vague to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656 (1979) (striking down wholly discretionary spot
checks of vehicles in part because unfettered discretion could lead to ‘indiscriminate
official interference’” (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883
(1975))).
75. Cf. Morales, 527 U.S. at 59 (reasoning that because an anti-gang loitering
ordinance gave police discretion to issue an order to disperse “only after prohibited
conduct has already occurred, it cannot provide the kind of advance notice that will
protect the putative loiterer from being ordered to disperse”).
76. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453, 476 (1997) (“Criminal law rules can contribute to normative forces; they
can shape, alter, and guide those forces, but only if the community accepts the law as
a legitimate source of moral authority.”).
77. David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 765, 765 (2001) (noting that community policing attempts to incorporate
“practically everyone”).
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community policing reports that residential involvement is often
dominated by older, whiter, and wealthier neighborhood residents.78
Business owners, whose values may differ from those of residents,
may have the ability to garner disproportionate attention by
providing funding to some of the public-private partnerships involved
in community policing programs.79
Because the rhetoric of
“community” is simultaneously popular and elusive, scholars have
warned that it can be co-opted by unrepresentative or majoritarian
populations.80 For example, one could imagine the NYPD justifying
aggressive police tactics against Occupy Wall Street through the lens
of community policing. Zuccotti Park, the original location for the
movement’s “occupation,” is privately owned.81 It is surrounded by
the country’s financial center, still raw from the largest mass murder
on American soil. Nearby is Tribeca, a neighborhood favored by
families with young children.82 Consulting only with “stakeholders”
seeking enforcement against the collateral effects of speech activities
would lead to very different police strategies than if demonstrators
and their supporters dominated the conception of “community.” For
this reason, several scholars have noted the importance of including
diverse and representative voices in the community policing process.83
While community is intended to shape the exercise of police
78. See Michael E. Buerger, A Tale of Two Targets: Limitations of Community
Anticrime Actions, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 137, 137–38
(David R. Karp ed., 1998); Wesley G. Skogan, Community Organizations and Crime,
in 10 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 39, 68 (Michael Tonry & Norval
Morris eds., 1988); Bernard E. Harcourt, Punishment and Crime: Policing L.A.’s Skid
Row: Crime and Real Estate Redevelopment in Downtown Los Angeles (an
Experiment In Real Time), 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 325, 329.
79. Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 305 (noting the role that private actors and
funding can play in community justice programs).
80. I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43,
77 (2009) (noting that “one of the unexplored drawbacks of community policing” is
that “police receive their cues from society”); Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 304–
09; Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
359, 381 (2005).
81. Kunstler, supra note 18, at 1017.
82. Tribeca, STREET ADVISOR, http://www.streetadvisor.com/tribeca-manhattannew-york-city-new-york (last visited Mar. 24, 2013); Tribeca Demographics, ZILLOW,
http://www.zillow.com/local-info/NY-New-York/Tribeca-people/r_270951/
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2013).
83. See, e.g., Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 305; Tracey L. Meares, Social
Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 215–17 (1998)
(discussing the concept of “linked fate,” both generally as with people who care
about how government policies affect loved ones, and specifically in African
Americans, who feel connected to Black strangers because of shared historical
circumstances).
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discretion, the very determination about which community members
to communicate and work with is itself discretionary.
In contrast, the theory of procedural justice makes clear that police
should listen not only to those who complain to police about
underenforcement, but also to the populations who will potentially be
policed. Procedural justice scholars emphasize this point directly by
teaching us that people are more likely to view police action as fair,
and will therefore be less likely to break the law and more likely to
comply with police, when they are given a chance to have their voices
heard.84 Applied to Occupy Wall Street, the lesson of procedural
justice is that police should meet not only with segments of the
population who believe they are inconvenienced or harmed by
protest activities, but also the protestors themselves, including those
most likely to violate the law.
When I was a community-based prosecutor,85 we would meet in
advance with protest organizers and agree to the rules of engagement.
Protestors knew what activities were lawful (or would be tolerated
through underenforcement), what would be treated with a citation,
and what would trigger custodial arrest. Demonstrators who wanted
to be arrested for civil disobedience reasons were given “easy” ways
to break the law. These arrestees would be taken away with plastic
zipties on their wrists. Protestors who went beyond the agreed upon
norms were subjected to the usual custodial process.
Opponents of including protestors in the conversation that shapes
the exercise of police discretion might argue that a group like Occupy
Wall Street is impossible to negotiate with because of its unique
nature. Occupy is largely non-hierarchical, with no named leaders or
organizers.86 However, as it continues, it has become more organized,
though still driven by individuals.87 Moreover, the level and means of
84. See Tom Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 THE ANNALS 84 (2004);
Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation
for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 355, 380 (2003).
85. See Burke, supra note 60 (drawing on my experience as part of Portland,
Oregon’s “Neighborhood District Attorney” program).
86. See Sandra D. Jordan, Victimization on Main Street: Occupy Wall Street and
the Mortgage Fraud Crisis, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485, 491 (2011); Marton, supra
note 26, at 1109.
87. For example, the New York City General Assembly represents itself as
“dozens of groups working together to organize and set the vision for the
#occupywallstreet movement.” About, #OCCUPY WALL STREET N.Y.C. GEN.
ASSEMBLY, http://www.nycga.net/about/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). The resulting
“Internet working group” has been described by one its creators as the movement’s
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communication used by protestors to communicate gathering times
and locations with one another, and to publicize its confrontations
with police, should be sufficient for police to communicate as well.
Occupy has been especially successful at publicizing its activities via
websites, message boards, Facebook, and Twitter.88 Law enforcement
could use these same online tools to communicate guidelines and
decisions with transparency and to encourage increased cooperation
between police and protestors.
Another potential conflict between community policing and
procedural justice theories is in the ultimate goals that should guide
police discretion.
Community policing emphasizes long-term
problem solving, but, just like the meaning of community, the terms
“problem” and “solving” are ambiguous. Consider, for example, the
possible problems reported to the police by mass demonstrations in
lower Manhattan as protestors move from the Financial District up to
Union Square Park. Concerns from residents could be as varied as
litter, noise, blocked traffic, trespassing, or fears of violence.
Concerns by protestors, if permitted to participate in the shaping of
police guidelines as part of “community,” might be about fears of
harassment or violence by opponents or police, or uncertainty about
the scope of their constitutional rights (e.g., hours of park closure,
street permit requirements, or noise restrictions against drums or
amplification).
How should the success of a community policing project be
measured? By an actual decrease in overall crime? The prevention
of serious crime? A decrease in complaints? An increase in overall
satisfaction?
In this context, again, procedural justice provides more specific
guidance. Thanks to procedural justice research, we know that
perceptions of police fairness, specifically the perception of fairness
demonstrated toward the policed, has instrumental value.89 People
subject to police conduct not only report more satisfaction, but are
also more likely to comply with law enforcement, when they perceive
that they have received a fair process.90 Moreover, people who are

“general assembly.” Adam Martin, Occupy Wall Street Is Building Its Own Social
Network, ATLANTIC WIRE (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/
2011/10/occupy-wall-street-building-its-own-social-network/43637/.
88. See Jennifer Preston, Protesters Look for Ways to Feed the Web, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2011, at A28.
89. See discussion infra Part II.A.
90. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
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outsiders to the encounter are also likely to feel better about police
discretion when they perceive that police have given procedural
fairness to the people they are policing.91 Here, the implications of
the research are again clear: Police should not only listen to
demonstrators; they should also treat them fairly. Doing so not only
will increase satisfaction in both protestors and those outsiders who
are viewing the protests, but also increase the perception of police
legitimacy, which in turn makes it less likely that protestors will
violate the law or disregard police commands.
B.

Neutrality

Although media reports about the policing of the Occupy
movement have often focused on claims of excessive force, supporters
of the movement have noted a separate concern about selective
enforcement. The New York Civil Liberties Union, for example,
collates “Free Speech Threat Alerts” that highlight “under-the-radar”
police activities that chill or punish the exercise of speech rights,
including targeted surveillance and the selective enforcement of
criminal law.92 Similarly, the Protest and Assembly Rights Project
also focuses on selective enforcement in alleging a broad pattern of
aggressive policing against the Occupy movement.93
Both community policing and procedural justice principles would
advise police to act neutrally toward protest movements. This
principle of neutrality means at the very least that law enforcement
should police a Tea Party protest in the same way it polices an
Occupy Wall Street protest.94 Preferential treatment based on the
viewpoint of the speaker undermines the perceived legitimacy of law
enforcement and serves no community justice values. Police also
should not enforce criminal law any more aggressively when it arises
from protest activity than when it arises within any other group
gathering in a public area. Crimes like trespass, jaywalking, and
blocking traffic are no more harmful when committed by a protestor
than by a marathon observer or concertgoer.
91. See supra notes 38–52 and accompanying text.
92. See NYC Free Speech Threat Assessment, N.Y. C.L. UNION,
http://www.nyclu.org/protest (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
93. See KNUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15.
94. Tea Party supporters have argued that big city mayors, whom they claim are
more likely to be liberal, have shown favoritism toward the Occupy Wall Street
movement by tolerating lawlessness by Occupy protestors. Alan Farnham, OWS
Getting Under Tea Party’s Skin, ABC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/
Business/tea-party-response-occupy-wall-st/story?id=14985439.
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There are two distinctions that police might, however, legitimately
draw in their policing of protestors without necessarily violating
principles of neutrality. First, neighborhood differences might
warrant more aggressive or different policing in one geographic area
than another. Here, community policing and procedural justice
potentially carry different implications regarding geographic
variations in the enforcement of criminal law. Because community
policing tends to define “community” geographically and then
permits the defined community to help identify and prioritize quality
of life concerns, geographic variations in police responses is not only
tolerated but expected. In the protest context, for example, one could
imagine that the congested, business-focused Financial District would
report more dissatisfaction with the potential collateral crimes
associated with a protest movement than would constituencies on the
Lower East Side of Manhattan. Accordingly, police might be less
likely to intervene with protest activity, even when in violation of
formal law, if conducted in an acceptable, geographic zone.95
Community policing’s emphasis on problem solving could lead to
similar geographic disparities. For example, thousands of protestors
in the financial district or midtown Manhattan would be more
disruptive to traffic than the same protest activities in a residential
district. Although the city could zone protest activity directly through
the permitting process,96 police could also zone informally by using
discretion to enforce a “zero tolerance” approach in congested areas,
and taking a more lenient approach in less congested areas.
From the perspective of procedural fairness, however, variations in
enforcement based on geography could potentially undermine the
perception of police neutrality. If, for example, protestors are
arrested in the Financial District for wearing masks when such
conduct is tolerated on the Lower East Side, protestors could
construe the disparity as creating a zone of privilege for the
geographic area that symbolizes the economic policies that the
Occupy movement is protesting. Discrepancies in enforcement by

95. For further discussion of treating the enforcement of criminal law differently
according to geographic distinctions, see Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic
Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning,
105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1219–46 (1996) and Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform

Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of
Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1166–82 (1999).
96. See Mary M. Cheh, Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment
Protection of Special Places, 8 U. D.C. L. REV. 53 (2004) (describing the use of “free
speech zones” to limit the geographic location of speech activity).
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geography, if perceived as a sign of hostility toward the protestors in
favor of the protested, would also undermine the perception that
police are acting out of a sense of caring and benevolence toward
protestors. The risk of such perceptions could potentially be
alleviated by giving careful regard to the other dimensions of
procedural fairness.
A second distinction police should consider is to underenforce
criminal law in protest settings compared to other group settings. As
Alexandra Natapoff has noted, “[s]ome underenforcement practices
are unfair, undemocratic, and harmful; others may be empowering,
responsive, and helpful.”97
Specifically, she identifies
underenforcement of minor offenses committed in the protest context
as a place when underenforcement can serve desirable values:
Although protesters often violate trespass, loitering, and other
criminal laws, police routinely do not fully enforce these laws, opting
for symbolic or partial enforcement in the spirit of the expressive
nature of the protest. We take it as a sign of social maturity that
police do not fully enforce criminal laws against protesters, and we
fear for our democracy when protesting lawbreakers are treated like
traditional criminals without regard for the expressive or First
Amendment values at stake. In this context, underenforcement is a
sign of truly responsive government, one that recognizes that not all
laws deserve to be enforced all of the time and that principles of
democratic accountability sometimes require law enforcement to
make room for public deviance.98

Randall Kennedy’s analogy of policing to a form of tax proves
helpful here.99 In its original context, Kennedy’s argument identified
the “racial tax” paid by African American communities to pay for
aggressive police tactics.100 Kennedy and others have argued that the
tax of policing should be paid equally.101 As noted above, at the very
least, the policing tax imposed on Occupy protestors should be no
higher than the tax paid by Tea Party protestors or marathon
97. Natapoff, supra note 25, at 1744.
98. Id. at 1743.
99. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997).
100. Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1999, at 30, 34
(identifying “a special kind of tax for the war against illegal immigration, drugs, and
other forms of criminality”).
101. Id. (arguing that the cessation of racial profiling would repeal the “racial
character” of the “tax” for law enforcement); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE:
RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 54 (1999) (arguing
that “well-to-do white people” would be more concerned about police tactics if they
were routinely subjected to them).
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observers or concertgoers. Arguably, though, people who gather in
large groups for the purpose of exercising speech rights should pay a
lower tax than other groups that present similar order-maintenance
challenges, because they are engaged in speech activities, whether the
positions are favored or not, that are valued in a democracy.
C.

Culture

Regardless of the content of the guidelines developed to govern
police discretion in enforcing criminal law against protestors, police
departments should emphasize to individual officers that the quality
of their decision making is determined not solely by outcomes but by
process. This conclusion of course flows from procedural justice
directly: Research demonstrates that people are more accepting of
police decision making, independent of outcome, when they perceive
it to be procedurally just.102 An emphasis on fair process is also
consistent with community policing’s emphasis on long-term
solutions. Thanks to the work of Tom Tyler and others, we know that
fair process in the long term drives outcomes because people are
more likely to comply with law if they are treated fairly.103
An emphasis on process has implications for police culture. Police
should be trained to treat protestors (and everyone else) with respect.
Even if they opt for intervention or enforcement or both, they can do
so with respect. Here, I return to the anecdotal observations that
gave rise to my interest in this Essay. Although police in Portland
have certainly clashed with protestors generally and with the Occupy
movement in particular, I watched as officers approached protestors
camping outside of City Hall. They approached casually, coffee cups
in hand. They were there to “chat,” prepared to escalate the
confrontation level if necessary.104 In contrast, the NYPD showed up
for what became the May Day Siege with their fight faces on.

102. TYLER, supra note 53, at 5 (“Justice concerns are seen as acting independently
of the influence of an outcome’s favorability.”); Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson,

Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of
Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 214 (2012)
(“Critically, perceptions of procedural fairness are outcome independent.”).
103. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
104. I confirmed my observations by meeting with a Portland Police Bureau
Captain and Commander to discuss the Bureau’s policing of protestors. As they
described their philosophy, police have “nowhere to go” if they start with a “zerotolerance” attitude in “riot gear.” They cannot “de-escalate.” Moreover, they have
been cautioned to avoid developing an “us versus them” culture. Notes from meeting
at Portland Police Cent. Precinct (Aug. 1, 2012) (on file with author).
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Specifically in the protest context, showing respect is not simply a
matter of being polite, but about respecting the exercise of
constitutional rights. Police should not arrive to a protest with the
perception that the demonstrators are the enemy. In fact, they should
not even view a protest as just another crowd control job. The police
are there not only to prevent protestors from causing trouble, but to
protect them against those who would silence, harass, or harm them.
The police, in short, are there not to police the protestors, but to be
protectors and peacekeepers for everyone present.
CONCLUSION
The dangers of overenforcement and underenforcement apply
equally to the policing of protestors as in other contexts. Looking
beyond formal law to community policing and procedural justice
principles offers some guidance as to best practices for the exercise of
police discretion in enforcing criminal law against protestors. At the
same time, however, examination of the community policing and
procedural justice principles in this context reveals potential tensions
between the two theories.

